We show that a downstream firm may source to an upstream firm (the potential entrant) with the pure purpose of entry deterrence. The reason is, on one hand, a supplier is forced to be a Stackelberg follower upon its entry into the downstream market; on the other hand, the total surplus from keeping the downstream market concentrated and the saving of entry cost is shared through their transaction in the upstream market, making each better off. Under many circumstances, strategic entry-deterring sourcing improves social welfare. For some range of parameters, it even benefits consumers.
Introduction
Seeking for appropriate suppliers is a crucial issue to any firm who demands intermediate product from outside. One possible concern is that there can be many channels for a key supplier to form entry threat to the downstream market, as pointed out in Caves and Porter (1977) :
"Firms with well-established distribution or service networks, the ability to produce components transformable into other commodities, etc., 
are identifiable as likely entrants into a given industry (group). Similarly, important suppliers to an industry (group) ... are often likely entry candidates."
There are still other reasons for key providers to be likely entrant candidates than what listed out in Caves and Porter (1977) . For example, it may be relatively easier for a provider to learn the market demand and the consumers' preference for the final product, or the technology to concert the intermediate product into the final product.
Intuitively a downstream firms should at least be cautious about the entry potential its major providers may possess. However, empirical finding tells a quite different story. Smiley (1988) summarized an extensive survey across a broad range of industries about what is the source of entry that concerns them most. One finding is, While the gap between the intuition and the real world left unfilled, our work shed light on the problem. We find that, under a large range of parameters, entry from a supplier is successfully blocked by an incumbent due to two reasons. Firstly, by sourcing a key component to the potential entrant, the incumbent can force the entrant to be a Stackelberg follower for the final product after its entry, therefore lower down the entrant's profit from entry to be zero. Secondly, by keeping the downstream market more concentrated, the total surplus generated is shared by the incumbent and the entrant through their transaction in the upstream market, leaving each better off than it would be otherwise. Therefore, the entrant is willing to accept the supplier's status and then stay out. In fact, the incentive to deter entry can dominate a firm's sourcing strategy, i.e. its choice of supplier, with the upshot that demand from a downstream firm is sourced in particular to an upstream firm who possesses entry potential, purely for the purpose of blocking future entry.
"In the opinion of the respondents, the dominant source for potential entrants into existing product lines was existing rivals (who do not have similar products
Note that the follower-ship of the supplier after its entry into the downstream market is endogenous to our model. Under very general assumptions, including that there is other resource of the intermediate product and free disposal of the incumbent, still it is true that the quantity ordered by the incumbent from the entrant can act as a commitment, forcing the entrant to accommodate as a follower.
There are some observations in real business world that a potential entrant is supplying an incumbent and does not really enter. One case is between Boeing and a Japanese consortium, composed of three of Japan's biggest industrial giants: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries LTD, and Fuji Heavy Industries. These Japanese firms expressed their interest in entering the market for commercial aircraft. Right after that, agreements are signed between Boeing and these Japanese firms. According to the agreements, Boeing outsourced to them part of its production of the 767-X fuselage in 1990s (Chicago Tribune, April 14, 1990) , then its production of wings, together with related research and development in 2000s.
Another case is between Lockheed and Boeing. Although Lockheed exited from the commercial aircraft market after 1981, it possesses the production capability to reenter and compete Boeing. Boeing signed a contract with Lockheed, sourcing its parts of commercial aircraft production to Lockheed. Lockheed never reentered the commercial aircraft market. (The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1989, p. 87) 1 . This nature of strategic sourcing which deters entry may seem to be collusive, since both firms benefit from a less competitive downstream market. However, we show that counter intuitively, strategic sourcing generally improves social welfare. Moreover, in some circumstances it even improve consumer's welfare, because the total quantity produced for the final product when entry is deterred can be larger than the quantity produced under entry.
Whenever strategic entry-deterring sourcing occurs, it must also be the potential entrant's interest to act as a supplier and stay out, although it otherwise can compete the incumbent and achieve positive profit. In practice, government may deliberately regulate the industry's behavior in order to have a successful penetration in the final product market. One example is from Japanese government (see Aggarwal (2003) , page 210). "The Japanese government identified semiconductors and computers as strategic industries as early as the 1950, and subsequently designed a comprehensive array of policies to foster their development, which provides domestic producers with a comprehensive advantage in domestic and international markets." One among these supportive policies is "prohibitions of the import of parts by U.S. subsidiaries". The success of these policies are documented. As a leading specialist in Japanese industrial policy argued, these unique policy incentives "cannot be ignored" in any explanation of the Japanese producers success in capturing a large slice of the American market.
The role of sourcing in entry deterrence has some similarity with the capacity construction by the incumbent (Spence (1977) , Dixit (1979 Dixit ( , 1980 ), in the sense that both grants the incumbent a first mover's advantage. However, capacity suffers the observability problem to the entrant in order to have entry deterred, as has recognized by Bagwell (1995) ; whereas in case of sourcing the quantity ordered by the incumbent is naturally observed by the supplier. More importantly, capacity construction is a single-sided decision made by the incumbent, while strategic sourcing can never occur if the entrant is unwilling to take its role. Therefore, more strategic interaction between the incumbent and the entrant is involved when entry is deterred through strategic sourcing.
Other related literature to our work includes Chen and Dubey (2005) , Chen et al. (2006) . They found that the first mover's advantage of the buyer leads to strategic sourcing decision, that is, firms will purchase from a provider who are out of the final product market ("outsider") even if these providers have higher cost compared to those "insiders" (firms who also produce the final product). The first mover's advantage of a buyer is also identified in Bakke et. al. (1998) to explain cross-supplies, the phenomenon that two or more firms in the same industry supply each other with their final products. Moreover, Spiegel (1993) finds that subcontracting can serve entry deterrence under the assumption of strictly convex production cost. Basu and Singh (1990) depicts the properties of entry deterrence in a Stackelberg game, with production cost for the entrant including an entry cost and a commencement cost. Chen and Ross (2000) finds the anticompetitive effect of alliance, in which capacity is shared hence a restrictive post-entry quantity is imposed to the entrant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark model with Cournot competition. Section 3 gives the major finding. Section 4, 5 and 6 shows the robustness of the major result with a different timing, with Bertrand competition, and with economies of scale for the intermediate product. Section 7 gives a generalization without specifying the post-entry competition rule.
The Model
The model consists of a monopoly incumbent, denoted as firm 0, for the final product good F . The only intermediate product required for producing good F is good I, which firm 0 can not produce. There exists a perfect competitive market for good I, from which firm 0 can purchase good I at the competitive price. Among the providers of good I, there exists a unique potential entrant for good F , denoted as firm 1, who by investing K < ∞, can acquire the same technology as firm 0 in converting good I into good F . All other firms who produce good I, denoted as firms 2,...,n, are symmetric to firm 1 except that they do not have the entry potential, or in other words, the required investment for them to be able to produce good F is infinity. The reason can be that only firm 1 has access to some critical technology or resource for producing good F .
Assume that one unit of good I can be converted into one unit of good F , and firm 0's constant average cost in converting good I into good F is normalized to zero. All firms 1, ..., n have the same technology (for simplicity) in manufacturing good I, with their constant marginal cost given as c > 0.
The inverse market demand on good F is given by P (Q), with P the price and Q the total quantity produced for good F . Assume that P (·) is concave and strictly decreasing in Q for Q <Q, withQ a large positive value.
The strategic interactions among these n + 1 firms are modelled as a three-stage game, denoted as game Γ.
In stage one, firm 0 proposes 2 firm 1 a take-it-or-leave-it offer, {p, x 1 }, specifying 2 Our major conclusion is not affected wether firm 0 or firm 1 has the power in determining p and x 1 , that x 1 units of good I will be ordered by firm 0 from firm 1 at price 3 p. To make the offer non-trivial, x 1 > 0 must hold, otherwise no transaction will ever occur between firms 0 and 1. After that, firm 1 chooses either to accept or reject the offer. Only if it accepts the offer, a binding contract represented by {p, x 1 } is signed between them. This procedure is shown by Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Bargaining Procedure in Stage One
In stage two, with the outcome in stage one observed, firm 1 decides wether to invest K to enter for good F or not.
Firm 0 observes firm 1's entry decision. In stage three, it can order more good I from firms 2, ..., n, which firm 1 does not observe since it is confidential between firm 0 and the chosen provider. If firm 1 has entered, firms 0 and 1 simultaneously decide quantities {q 0 , q 1 } to produce for good F , otherwise firm 0 decides q 0 along.
Since firms 2,...,n are symmetric, it does not matter to assume that firm 2 is firm 0's provider of good I whenever firm 0 orders from a firm other than firm 1. Denote x 2 as the quantity firm 0 orders from firm 2. Moreover, assume firm 0 has free disposal for the amount of good I it purchases as will be shown later. 3 Our major conclusion keeps intact if non-linear pricing is allowed, i.e. instead of the unit price p, firm 0 offers a total payment for the quantity it orders.
4 This is to make our assumption general. Without free disposal, the effectiveness of sourcing in entry deterrence can only be strengthened since the disposal cost helps to make firm 0's order of good I from firm 1 a commitment to its future quantity of good F .
What remains is to describe the profits for firms 0, 1, 2 at the terminal notes. Denote the total profit to firm i, i = 0, 1 as Π
The game Γ is common knowledge. Solution concept employed for Γ is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), denoted simply by equilibrium in the following text. In equilibrium firm 0 will order
Since firm 0's expenditure on x 1 is already sunk, its problem is 
Particularly, at x 1 = 0, firm 0 is ordering solely from firm 2 and its reaction function is M M . Firm 1 knows that firm 0 must be ordering from firm 2, but does not know the quantity it orders. In this case these two firms are symmetric and they engage in standard Cournot competition, with their Cournot-Nash quantities given by (W 0 , W 1 ) and corresponding profits given by and its problem is max
) be the solution to the first order condition 
By envelope theorem,
Denote the profits for firm 0 and firm 1 at x 
). Since the cost of good I is sunk for firm 0, we have π
The post-entry equilibrium quantity and profit for each firm are summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If firm 1 enters the market of good F , their NE quantities are
And NE profits in stage three are
A critical fact to our analysis is that π does not meet its demand on good I. It's problem is given by
Let the coordinates of point M, O on the x-axis be (M 0 , O 0 ) respectively. Then M 0 is firm 0's monopoly quantity with marginal cost c, and O 0 is its monopoly quantity with marginal cost zero. I.e.
Denote firm 0's profit in stage three with
Lemma 2 gives firm 0's equilibrium quantity and profit.
Lemma 2 If firm 1 stays out, the equilibrium quantity and profit in stage three are which is credible to firm 1 as the future q 0 in their duopoly competition, it is still profitable for firm 1 to enter since it achieves π V 1 − K > 0 upon entry. Firm 0 lacks a effective vehicle to deter entry. We call this scenario as entry can not be deterred.
) (see (1)) and the fact that π
) and K. Firm 0's reaction function jumps down at some point on W V and coincides the horizontal axis thereafter, see the heavy curve in Figure 3 . 
Lemma 3 The function τ (K) is strictly decreasing. For any
The rest part follows our analysis above. Firm 1's entry rule is summarized by Lemma 4. ), i = 0, 1 their profits when firm 1 is staying out. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is straightforward to have
Lemma 4 In any SPNE, firm 1 always stays out for
For simplicity, we denote the scenario that no contract is struck in stage one as x
, entry is blockaded and firm 0 faces no real entry threat. Therefore, it will order x 1 > 0 to firm 1 only if p ≤ c. On the other hand, firm 1 will never sign a contract with p < c, x 1 > 0 since it ends up with negative profit. Thus in any SPNE, it must be that either p = c, x
Our analysis below will focus on the case when 
− K must hold at the same time. These two conditions together imply
However, it is never true. To see this, firstly, [P (Q) − c]Q is strictly concave in Q and is maximized at Q = M 0 by the definition of M 0 . Secondly, W 0 + W 1 > M 0 , due to the fact that firm 0's Cournot reaction curve M M has slope between (−1, 0).
Condition (3) is violated, proving the lemma.
Moreover, if in any SPNE firm 1 enters, each of firms 0 and 1 gets the Cournot-Nash profit. See the following lemma. In the following analysis, we focus on
Lemma 6 In any SPNE, if firm 1 enters, it must be that either
, the range of K where entry can be strategically deterred by firm 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that when firm 0 is indifferent between deterring or accommodating entry, it chooses to deter entry. Lemma 7 tells us that in any SPNE, if firm 0 strategically deters entry, p > c must hold. 
Proof: By Lemma 4, firms 0 and 1 must have struck a deal with x 1 ≥ τ to have firm 1 stay out. If firm 1 offers p = c, firm 1 knows that it will stay out and end up with a zero profit, if it accepts firm 0's offer. However, by rejecting the offer, it will enter and reap π W 1 − K > 0. Thus it will reject firm 0's offer, a contradiction. Therefore firm 0 must offer p > c to firm 1 to guarantee firm 1 a profit no less than π
By Lemma 2 and (2), firm 0's problem under entry deterrence is
To be precise, define the function p(x
Total profits for firms 0 and 1 are
It follows Lemma 2, Lemma 7, the definitions of Graph B and p(τ ).
Major Result
, entry is blockaded, and firm 1 is symmetric to any of firms 2,...,n. At the competitive price p = c, firm 0 is indifferent between ordering its monopoly quantity M 0 from any of them. For K < π V 1 , entry can not be deterred. Sourcing to firm 1 is no longer a viable enter-deterring strategy for firm 0: any x 1 > V 0 is incredible to firm 1 as firm 0's future quantity of good F , and any x 1 < V 0 is not large enough to drive down firm 1's post-entry profit to zero. In our model, by no means can firm 0 deter firm 1's entry.
The following analysis focuses on when K is in the middle range, i.e.
). Firm 0 can always successfully deter entry by offering to purchase τ (K) units under a large enough price p, to give firm 1 enough lure to accept the offer and stay out. By Lemma 7, p > c must incur to achieve such a goal. Thus for each unit of good I it orders from firm 1, firm 0 incurs p − c > 0 amount of extra cost compared to ordering from firm 2. There is a trade off for firm 0 between its monopoly status and the burden incurred by deterring entry. If under some circumstances it is too costly for firm 0 to deter entry so that it would rather let entry occur, we call it as entry is accommodated. (by Lemma 6). By Lemma 8, it will engage in entry deterrence only if
which implies:
This condition is always satisfied since
The left-hand-side of Condition (7) is strictly increasing in K,
Its right-hand-side strictly decreases in K. There exists a unique K which equates these two sides. Denote it asK and define it bȳ 
Proof: Proof to (I) and (IV) follows easily from Lemma 4 and Lemma 6.
Proof to (II), (III). Firstly, notice that (6) and (7) are necessary conditions for entry to be strategically deterred in SPNE. Secondly, we show that they are also sufficient. When they are satisfied, (5) is true, implying that firm 0's optimal profit in deterring entry is larger than its optimal profit when entry occurs. Firm 0 will not deviate to allowing entry. On the other side, by Lemma 8, firm 1 gets (p − c)x 1 = π W 1 − K by accepting firm 0's offer. By Lemma 6, firm 1 has no incentive to deviate to rejecting the offer and entering for good F . The rest part of (II) and (IIIa) follows immediately. Thirdly, when K <K, Condition (7) is violated. There does not exist any p > c at which x 1 ≥ τ can leave both firms 0 and 1 no worse off than they would be under entry. Firm 0 foresees entry and will accommodate it. The rest part of (IIIb) follows Lemma 6. Lastly, we show that there does not exist any SPNE other than what stated by (II) and (III) in the theorem. This simply follows Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and Lemma 8.
The pure reason for firm 0 to source to firm 1 at p > c is to deter its entry. Moreover, if K > K M , firm 0 will also source to firm 2 with x
The following corollary is straightforward.
Corollary 1 In any SPNE, when entry is strategically deterred, firm 0 sources also to firm 2 only if
Requiring firm 0's threat of a predatory amount upon entry to be credible makes entry deterrence harder. When π V 1 >K, such a restriction increases the lower bound of K (fromK to π V 1 ) at which entry can be deterred. For K ∈ (K, π V 1 ], it is still true that deterring entry can create a positive surplus for both firm 0 and firm 1. However, entry can not be deterred, because the least quantity of firm 0 which is large enough to make firm 1's entry unprofitable is no longer credible to firm 1.
When Firm 1 Is Setting {p, x

1
} In Stage One
In the SPNE of game Γ, whenever a deal is struck between firms 0 and 1 in stage one, it must be that none of them is worse off compared to without a deal. The nature of entry deterrence in our model is collusive. We would expect that major conclusions of game Γ will be kept intact if firm 1 is the one who offers price and/or quantity to firm 0. For example, modify game Γ in a way that in stage one firm 1 offers {p, x 1 } then firm 0 decides to accept it or not. Denote the modified game as Γ 1 .
It is clear that whenever entry is blockaded or entry can not be deterred, nothing will change in the SPNE of game Γ 1 compared to game Γ. We focus on when
Again firm 1 will stay out if and only if x 1 ≥ τ (K). Suppose that having entry deterred is better off to both firms 0 and 1. If τ (K) ≥ M 0 , firm 1 will offer
is not enough to keep firm 1 out, whereas x 1 > τ (K) decreases the total profit from the market of good F , which is the amount they share through their transaction on good I. To maximize firm 1's share, firm 1 will offer p = P (τ ) + π W 0 /τ , the highest price firm 0 will accept. Notice that only when K ≥K will firms 0 and 1 strike a deal, since x 1 = τ (K) is still true whenever firm 1 wants to have its entry deterred by firm 0. If τ (K) < M 0 , firm 1's problem is
Define the functionp(x
We have a proposition below.
Proposition 1 The SPNE depicted by Theorem 1 is kept the same for Γ 1 , except that when entry is strategically deterred, it is
Note that when entry is deterred, p > c, x 1 ≥ τ holds. The pure purpose of firm 0 to accept firm 1's offer is still to deter entry. However, with firm 1 the one who decides their sourcing contract, the whole surplus from entry deterrence is reaped by firm 1.
A Linear Example
To establish more precise conclusions, consider an example with the market demand for good F given by P = max{0, a − Q}, with a > c > 0, Q = q 0 + q 1 . The following values are easily calculated: 
which gives the threshold of
. . We will analyze them separately. (7) is rewritten as
Values of a satisfying this inequality is found as a > (1 + √ 3)c. There are two subcases.
. Entry is always strategically deterred.
For K ≤K, entry is accommodated. Firm 0 will source to firm 2 in order to have the lowest possible cost in their standard Cournot competition. Instead, for K >K, entry is strategically deterred.
, firm 0 sources solely to firm 1 with x 1 = τ (K), then produces q 0 = τ (K) ≥ M 0 for good F . Firm 1 sources to a high-price provider and produces more than its monopoly quantity, in order to deter firm 1's entry. When τ (K) > M 0 , q 0 = M 0 is optimal for firm 1, and it will expand the entry-deterring quantity x 1 = τ (K) by sourcing either to firm 1 or firm 2.
Case
, firm 0 may source to both firm 1 and firm 2, with total quantity for good F given by q 0 = M 0 .
Entry becomes impossible to be deterred for K < K V . For any given value of K, this implies that the value of c is relatively small compared with the market size, so that even if firm 1 is competing a firm who has zero marginal cost, entry is still profitable for firm 1. Conclusions of this example are shown by Figure 5 .
Social Welfare Analysis
In this section we investigate the impact on social welfare of strategic sourcing which deters firm 1's entry, where social welfare is measured as the summation of consumer's surplus and firms' profits.
For
,K}, firm 0 may order good I from firm 1, but that has no distortion on the social welfare. The range of K matters to our analysis
, in which entry is strategically deterred through firm 0's sourcing to firm 1. For K in this range, if firm 1 is not providing good I at all, the unique equilibrium is that firm 1 enters and Cournot quantity W 0 + W 1 is produced for good F . Take this as the benchmark case. Social welfare is
in the benchmark case. When there is strategic sourcing leading to entry deterrence, social warfare is
measures the distortion of strategic sourcing on social welfare. Define
A(K) measures the society's loss due to strategic sourcing, net of the saving of K. It is strictly increasing in K for K < K M and becomes a constant thereafter. The relationship of A(K) and K is shown in Figure 6 .
Proposition 2 Entry-deterring strategic sourcing from firm 0 to firm 1 strictly improves social welfare when K >
There are two effects of strategic sourcing on social welfare. The first one is its impact on firms' profits through the saving of K and the distortion on selling of good F . Since strategic sourcing exists only when both firms agree with their sourcing contract, it is clear that each firm must get no less than what it can have without strategic sourcing. The first effect improves social welfare. The second one is the change of consumers' welfare, which can be negative or positive, solely depending on the quantity produced of good F . If τ (K) which firm 0 sources is so large that τ (K) > W 0 + W 1 , the CournotNash quantity when it accommodates entry, consumers' welfare can also improve. Figure 6 give the regime in which strategic sourcing which deters entry strictly improves social welfare. In area A, the value of K is so small that to deter entry, firm 0 has to source τ (K) close to or even larger than the duopoly quantity. The upshot is, either the second effect is negative but small so is dominated by the first effect, or even the second effect is positive. Denote K 1 ≡ {K|τ (K) = W 0 + W 1 }. The area in A with K < K 1 has not only both firms better off, but also consumers' welfare improved due to a larger quantity sold for good F than the duopoly quantity. Instead, in area B, K is large so that firms save a lot by deterring an inefficient entry, whereas quantity produced for good F is M 0 < W 0 + W 1 , thus consumers are strictly worse off. The first effect dominates the second effect hence social welfare is higher.
Consider the linear demand case P = max{0, a − Q} with a > c > 0,
), sourcing between firms 0 and 1 which deters firm 1's entry is social welfare improving. On the other hand, when
. Social welfare is also
). Moreover, with K 1 calculated as
, consumers' welfare increases under strategic sourcing for
When Good I Is Ordered in Stage One
In the basic model, we assume that after firm 1's entry decision, firm 0 can expand x 1 by ordering more of good I from firm 2. A different timing worthy to be investigated is when firm 0 must order all its demand on good I in stage one. This models situation, for example, when transportation of good I requires time, so that firm 0 has to order good I ahead of the final product competition with a certain period.
We modify the timing of Γ as the following: There are still three stages. In stage one, firm 0 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer {p, x 1 } to firm 1, then firm 1 decides either to accept or reject. After observing firm 1's decision, firm 0 orders quantity x 2 from the competitive market. In stage two, firm 1 decides to enter or stay out. If it enters, in stage three, firms 0 and 1 determines quantities q 0 , q 1 for good F , otherwise firm 0 decide q 0 along. Note that firm 1 can not observe the value of x 2 either prior to or post to its entry. Denote the modified game as Γ 2 . Solution concept for Γ 2 is sequential equilibrium, denoted simply as equilibrium for this section.
With K ≥ π 
If Firm 1 Is Not Providing I
We firstly consider the simplified case when firm 1 is out of the market of good I. Firm 1 knows that firm 0 orders from firm 2, but can not observe the value of x 2 . Proof: Firstly, we show the strategies and belief above constitute an equilibrium. Given firm 1's belief, its optimal strategy is to enter and produce q 1 = W 1 ; given firm 1's strategy, firm 0 is optimal producing q 0 = W 0 , thus it should source x 2 = W 0 . Secondly, we show that there does not exist any other equilibrium.
Lemma 9 For
Suppose that firm 1 believes that firm 0 has sourced x 2 ≥ τ (K) hence stays out. However, given firm 1's strategy, firm 0 should source only x 2 = M 0 , to reap its monopoly profit. Thus firm 1 should not believe that firm 0 is deterring entry, and it should enter. Given that firm 1 enters, the only intersection of their reaction functions in the final-product market is point W , at which each has no incentive to deviate. Hence the strategies together with firm 1's belief specified by the lemma is the unique equilibrium. Proof: It is easy to see that i, ii constitute two pure strategy equilibria and there does not exist other pure strategy equilibrium. Firm 0 chooses between x 2 = W 0 and x 2 = M 0 ; firm 1 chooses between entering or staying out. If firm 0 is accommodating entry yet firm 1 stays out, the outcome is that firm 0 is a monopolist which produces q 0 = W 0 . Instead, if firm 0 is deterring entry yet firm 1 enters, firm 0 will produce q x 0 ≡ min{M 0 , V 0 }, since its reaction function in stage three is OO . Total payoff for each firm is given below:
For firm 0, given that firm 1 enters, π
There must exist a mixed strategy equilibrium, with firm 1's expected profit being zero.
If Firm 1 Is Providing I
Now we back to game Γ 2 . Through our analysis above, if firm 1 chooses to stay out of the market for good I, its equilibrium profit is either π W 1 − K or zero. This gives the intuition that the entry decision in equilibrium should be the same as in game Γ, since firm 1 can guarantee itself no more than π W 1 − K by rejecting firm 0's offer. We have a lemma below.
, entry is strategically deterred as long as Condition (7) holds, and is accommodated otherwise.
Proof: The total profit under entry in equilibrium is still π (6) is required for entry deterrence but it is always true; if K < K M , the condition for entry-deterrence to be profitable compared with the total profit under entry is given by (7). Proof: It is straightforward since Condition (7) is satisfied when K ≥K.
When Post Entry Competition Isà la Bertrand
It is interesting to investigate what if the post entry competition between firms 1 and 2 isà la Bertrand rather than Cournot. For this section, we assume that if firm 1 enters, firms 0 and 1 produce differentiated good F . They compete by setting prices r 0 , r 1 for good F , respectively. Assume demand functions for firms 0 and 1 are q 0 (r 0 , r 1 ) and q 1 (r 0 , r 1 ) in stage three. We impose all standard assumptions on the demand functions, including that self-effect dominates cross-effect, reaction functions be upward sloping, so that there exists a unique interior solution for their competition. Denote this game as Γ B .
Firms 0 and 1's reaction functions in the post-entry game are illustrated by Figure 7 . RR is firm 1's reaction curve after its entry. 
, sourcing a large enough quantity from firm 0 to firm 1 can again deter entry. We will then focus on this range of K.
If firm 1 stays out in any SPNE, it must be that firm 0 sources a positive quantity to firm 1 under p > c. Instead, if firm 1 enters in any SPNE, no sourcing can occur between firms 0 and 1 with p > c. The first statement is clear since firm 0 must remedy firm 1's loss by staying out. For the second statement, notice that under entry, their competition yields point W as the equilibrium (the hatched area in Figure 7 shows Poretal improvement from point W for both firms), whether sourcing happens between firms 0 and 1 or not. With firm 1's entry expected in stage one, if p > c, firm 0 is unwilling to source to firm 1; if p < c, firm 1 is unwilling to provide. Only at p = c it is possible for an sourcing contract to be signed followed by firm 1's entry. . Thus firm 1's net profit upon entry is ξ . By converting the system of demand functions into inverse demand functions,
we solve the game when post entry rule is Cournot competition. 6 When There Are Economies of Scale for Producing I Two reasons make strategic sourcing when economies of scale prevail for producing good I be interesting. The first reason is practical. Our model applies to the worldwide outsourcing, and one important incentive for outsourcing is to pursue economies of scale. The second reason is, the existence of economies of scale incurs complicated strategic consideration, which may make our former prediction ambiguous. Under economies of scale, firm 1 has incentive to attract firm 0's order if it is going to enter in spite of the follower's disadvantage, because the units it produces for firm 0 helps to decrease its future production cost. On the other side, firm 0 will be cautious about sourcing to firm 1, since by doing so, firm 1 may be seduced to enter as an entrenched competitor of good F . When such a consideration dominates, firm 0 may no longer source to firm 1. In this case, it must be that firm 0 orders solely from one firm out of firms 2,...,n to utilize economies of scale.
However, we find that the basic argument for the benchmark game applies here with economies of scale, leaving the qualitative part of our major conclusion intact. Under quite general assumptions, the lure for firm 0 to source to firm 1 in order to deter entry is well preserved, which may dominates other strategic considerations and lead to a sourcing contract between firms 0 and 1.
Suppose firms 1, ..., n's production cost C(q) for good I satisfies C (q) > 0, C (q) < 0 for ant unit of q ≥ 0. To guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium between firms 0 and 1 after firm 1's entry, assume
where Q = q 0 + q 1 . Condition (8) requires that the cost concavity for good I can not be too large. As an example, consider the case with linear demand P (Q) = max{0, a − Q} and quadratic cost C(q) = cq − vq . Moreover, let the price of good I required by firms 2, ..., n as p 2 , ..., p n in stage three. All other issues are kept the same as in the baseline model.
The validity of strategic sourcing aimed at entry-deterrence is well kept. To see this, note if x 1 is large but not too large, firm 1 knows that after its entry firm 0's quantity of good F is given by x 1 . The reason is, on the one side, ordering a little bit more from any other provider entails a high price for firm 0 hence is not profitable; on the other side firm 0 has no incentive to leave any of x 1 unused since its cost is sunk. Thus firm 1's optimal choice is to accommodate the value of x 1 by producing the follower's quantity upon its entry. Its optimal profit after entry is
By envelope theorem, dπ
Again it is possible for firm 0 to drive down firm 1's post-entry profit to zero through sourcing to it a large enough quantity.
Moreover, having firm 1 stay out with a constructed buyer-seller relationship can be profitable for both firms 0 and 1. The argument is as follows. When firm 0 is a monopolist, the profit it can reap from the market of good F is bigger than the total profit of duopolists, even if firm 1 supplies firm 0 with a decreasing average cost. In this case, firms 0 and 1 can find an appropriate price at which the payment from firm 0 to firm 1 is enough to remedy firm 1's loss by staying out, and at the same time leave firm 0 no worse off than in a duopoly market.
To have a closed-form solution under economies of scale, assume the market demand for good F and the marginal cost for good I are both linear. More precisely, assume P (Q) = max{0, a − Q}, production cost of good I is
for q > c 2v
Assume the parameters satisfy 0 < c < a ≤ c 2v .
The last inequality of Condition (9) guarantees that in equilibrium, any quantity for good F produced by firm 1 entails positive marginal cost. Notice that v < 1 2 by (9). Timing of the game is the same as game Γ. Denote the new game as Γ (a, c, v) . There is one obvious change in our finding compared to the baseline model. When entry is strategically deterred, firm 0 always sources exclusively to firm 1. This phenomenon of course is driven by scale economies.
Discussion
Entry-deterring sourcing can happen with either Cournot or Bertrand rule imposed on firm 0 and firm 1's post-entry competition. Without a specific competition rule, we may have more insight on the condition which entails the strategic sourcing.
Suppose there is a perfect competitive market of good I and production cost of good I is C(·). 
